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This article examines emerging trends in New Zealand's Privacy Act 1993 (the Act) litigation 
emanating from the Human Rights Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), which adjudicates cases brought 
under the Act. The Tribunal can award a range of remedies including damages, injunctions and 
declarations but in recent years it has also developed other remedies, such as training orders, aimed 
at remedying systemic privacy failures within agencies. The legitimacy of these is assessed against 
the backdrop of legislative lethargy in implementing parallel recommendations for law reform aimed 
at similar mischiefs. The article surveys all cases brought before the Tribunal (in its privacy 
jurisdiction) over a ten-year period from 2007 until 2016 inclusive. Brief comparison is made with 
Tribunal awards for discrimination under its non-privacy jurisdiction. The article also examines the 
reasons for a significant increase in the average amount of damages in recent years, especially in the 
Tribunals' privacy jurisdiction. Contributing factors to this include the changing nature of the types 
of dispute and the defendants involved as well as the discretion afforded to the Tribunal. Whilst the 
Tribunal has significantly modified its approach, other significant influences have included a recent 
increase in the number of private sector defendants. The Tribunal's substantive jurisprudence as to 
the nature of the obligations contained in the Act's privacy principles has also continued to evolve 
thereby vindicating New Zealand's principles-based data privacy regime.  
I INTRODUCTION  
New Zealand's principles-based data privacy legislation, the Privacy Act 1993 (the Act), and the 
specialist tribunal for litigation brought under it, the Human Rights Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), 
has undoubtedly helped New Zealand to adapt to threats to privacy from rapidly changing social 
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norms and technologies. Does this flexibility, however, lead to the inevitable criticism that justice 
varies according to the "chancellor's foot"? This was the question starkly raised by counsel in one case 
appealed from the Tribunal to the High Court:1 
The appellant's argument is that since the appointment of Mr Haines QC as the new Chair of the Tribunal 
it has lifted its award of damages. The appellant says this lift is inconsistent with High Court authority, 
and that it is beyond the Tribunal to do that. 
This article examines whether the Tribunal's approach to remedies under the Act has changed by 
studying litigation brought before it in the five years preceding the appointment of its current 
chairperson and contrasting this with the litigation in the five years after his appointment. Moreover, 
the article explores whether broader trends are evidenced in the two periods surveyed, such as the 
nature of defendants, types of conduct complained of and types of plaintiffs bringing the complaints. 
The article also examines trends in the success rates of litigation and other factors affecting the 
outcomes such as the extent and nature of legal representation for the parties.  
In addition, it will be seen that the nature of remedies, other than damages, awarded against 
defendants by the Tribunal has markedly changed. One such remedy is an order that requires 
offending agencies to undertake comprehensive training programmes on compliance with the Act 
under the supervision of the Privacy Commissioner. Such orders are not restricted to flagrant privacy 
breaches as occurred in a celebrated case involving a Facebook post of a cake, the use of which by a 
previous employer resulted in a damages award of $168,000, the highest such award to date.2 Another 
type of order is that, when access to information is sought under the Act,3 a specific performance 
order that defendants make the information available is commonly granted as opposed to granting 
only damages for the inconvenience, humiliation or injury to feelings from not having access to it.  
The article discusses the legitimacy of these developments against the backdrop of law reform 
proposals for the Act.4 It will be seen that the Tribunal has been able to address many of the systemic 
privacy issues identified by the Law Commission as needing legislative change through amplifying 
the requirements of the existing principles-based rules. The article examines whether there are limits 
to how far this process can extend.  
  
1  Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development v Holmes [2013] NZHC 672, [2013] NZAR 760 at 
[126]. 
2  Hammond v Credit Union Baywide [2015] NZHRRT 6. 
3  Privacy Act 1993, s 6, principle 6.  
4  Law Commission Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 4 (NZLC R123, June 
2011) [Law Commission Report]. 
 NEW ACTORS AND THE EVOLVING NATURE OF PRIVACY ACT JURISPRUDENCE IN NEW ZEALAND 443 
II SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This study was guided by previous research on Tribunal jurisprudence in New Zealand. An early 
article explored the relative paucity of monetary awards due to the alternative dispute resolution and 
conciliation mechanisms provided by the Act,5 whilst another highlighted the principles of the Act 
that were most litigated as well as the nature of the defendants.6 Subsequent research drew attention 
to the reality that most litigation in the Tribunal occurred between parties already engaged in some 
manner of dispute not involving privacy.7  
Although the data gathered for the present article may, therefore, be contrasted with these earlier 
efforts, the goal of the present research differs significantly from them. In particular this article seeks 
to establish whether the application of the Act has reached a new stage of maturity where more serious 
contraventions are punished appropriately while, at the same time, the nature of defendants, their 
privacy awareness, as well as the steps taken by them towards compliance with the Act prior to the 
complaint that led to the litigation, are all factored into the tailoring of remedies awarded.  
In order to make such an assessment the research identified all the decisions of the Tribunal under 
the Act, as opposed to its parallel jurisdiction under other legislation,8 between 2007 and 2016. The 
study therefore included 69 substantive cases before the Tribunal. This excluded preliminary or 
interlocutory rulings, strike-out applications and applications for costs where claims were 
discontinued. In line with the earlier research, cases from the Tribunal that were further appealed to 
the High Court or the Court of Appeal were only counted once to avoid double-counting.  
These 69 cases were, however, further segmented into two distinct periods: first, between 2007 
and the end of 2011 and, second, between 2012 and 2016. In the first five-year period the chairperson 
of the Tribunal was Royden Hindle. In the second five-year period this was Rodger Haines QC.9 The 
former oversaw 28 substantive cases and the latter 41 cases.  
Analysis of these contrasting periods allowed statistics to be calculated which amongst other 
things evaluated the success rates of litigation in each period, the proportion of cases that were self-
funded or brought by individuals, in addition to classification of the defendants as public or private 
  
5  Katrine Evans "Show Me the Money: Remedies under the Privacy Act" (2005) 36 VUWLR 475. 
6  Gehan Gunasekara and Erin Dillon "Data Protection Litigation in New Zealand: Processes and Outcomes" 
(2008) 39 VUWLR 457. 
7  Gehan Gunasekara and Alida Van Klink "Out of The Blue? Is Litigation Under The Privacy Act 1993 
Addressed Only at Privacy Grievances?"  (2011) 17 Canta LR 229. 
8  Human Rights Act 1993; and Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
9  Rodger Haines QC took over as chairperson and presided over some interlocutory matters in the latter part of 
2011 but no substantive decisions were given under him as chairperson until March 2012. See Lochead-
MacMillan v AMI Insurance Ltd [2012] NZHRRT 5. 
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sector and the conduct they engaged in. Lastly, the remedies awarded, monetary or otherwise, in the 
two periods are contrasted and a brief comparison is attempted with the remedies that were awarded 
by the Tribunal in its parallel non-privacy related jurisdiction,10 but detailed examination of these 
cases is beyond the scope of the present article.  
III NATURE OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ALLEGED 
CONDUCT 
More cases came before the Tribunal in the five years that Haines has been chairperson than under 
the previous five years when Hindle was chairperson: 41 as opposed to 28. This provided ample 
material for analysis. It is worth noting that previous studies of litigation under the Act have 
demonstrated the predominance of public sector agencies as defendants.11 This pattern continued 
during Hindle's period, with 79 per cent involving the public sector and 21 per cent concerning the 
private sector.  
During Haines' period there has been, on the other hand, a marked change in the nature of the 
defendants. Public sector defendants accounted for only 54 per cent whilst private sector defendants 
constituted 46 per cent. This narrowing of the gap between sectors may explain, at least partly, the 
types and extent of remedies awarded in the latter period surveyed in this article.  
Amongst these private sector defendants were companies,12 self-employed individuals,13 a 
funeral home,14 lawyers,15 and medical practitioners.16 One theme that emerged was that significant 
damages awards have been made against private sector defendants who failed to respond in a timely 
manner or at all to information requests by individuals.17 The Act requires, amongst other things that 
an agency receiving an information privacy request must within 20 working days make a decision on 
whether to make the information available in addition to communicating this decision and whether 
any charge for supplying it is to be imposed.18 Failure to adhere to these requirements can have 
  
10  Human Rights Act, s 92I; and Health and Disability Commissioner Act, s 54. 
11  Gunasekara and Van Klink, above n 7. 
12  See for example Taylor v Orcon Ltd [2015] NZHRRT 15.  
13  See for example Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Hamilton [2012] NZHRRT 24. 
14  Hale v Chester Burt Funeral Home Ltd [2012] NZHRRT 10. 
15  See for example Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Schubach [2015] NZHRRT 4. 
16  See for example Waxman v Pal [2016] NZHRRT 28. 
17  Privacy Act 1993, s 6, principle 6. See Director of Human Rights Proceedings v INS Restorations Ltd [2012] 
NZHRRT 18; Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Hamilton, above n 13; and Director of Human Rights 
Proceedings v Valli & Hughes [2014] NZHRRT 58. 
18  Section 40. 
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detrimental consequences for the requester and lead to not insignificant remedies against the agency 
concerned.  
In Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Valli & Hughes, for instance, the plaintiff, a relatively 
young and inexperienced employee, made several requests for personal information in relation to his 
individual employment agreement, pay slips and wages, which were ignored.19 On the bankruptcy of 
the defendant, the plaintiff discovered that the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) had no record of 
his employment, no tax having been paid to it. As a result, when the plaintiff subsequently received 
the unemployment benefit he remained uncertain and concerned about his new tax liability with the 
IRD and future employment. In addition to specific performance the Tribunal awarded $20,000 in 
damages.20  
Another flagrant contravention, in a commercial context, was Director of Human Rights 
Proceedings v INS Restorations Ltd.21 Proceedings were brought by the sole shareholder and director 
of a company who, discovering that without her knowledge her shares and directorship had been 
transferred to another, addressed a request to the company for access to all of the personal information 
held by the company about her.22 Although the request was not complied with, her name reappeared 
in the register before the day of the hearing.23 The plaintiff had clearly been manipulated by her former 
partner who, whilst being an undischarged bankrupt, had operated as a "shadow director" of the 
company. In assessing the damages the Tribunal stated:24 
… the circumstances of fraud make the facts particularly serious and we have determined in this case that 
$20,000 is the appropriate figure to reflect the unique facts. … timely compliance with the request for 
personal information would have facilitated an early end to the apparent manipulations. 
Likewise, Lochead-MacMillan v AMI Insurance Ltd concerned a request for information about 
the plaintiffs collected in connection with their insurance claim.25 The Tribunal held that the 
defendant, which the Tribunal noted according to its website was at the time the largest wholly New 
Zealand owned fire and general insurance company, failed to comply with statutory time limits,26 
  
19  Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Valli & Hughes, above n 17. 
20  For a wider discussion of privacy issues concerning employment see Paul Roth "Employment Law" [2016] 
NZ L Rev 646. 
21  Director of Human Rights Proceedings v INS Restorations Ltd, above n 17.  
22  At [1]. The requested information included the share transfer form, the notice of resignation as director and 
the corresponding Board resolutions. 
23  At [1].   
24  At [67].  
25  Lochead-MacMillan v AMI Insurance Ltd, above n 9. 
26  See Privacy Act, s 40. 
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amounting to an interference with privacy.27 Somewhat disturbingly, it emerged that the defendant's 
branch manager had believed that acceptance of the insurance claims would dispose of the need for 
the information to be provided, despite the plaintiffs making subsequent information requests.28  
This indicates, perhaps, a lack of knowledge of the most basic of the Act's requirements. The 
existence of erroneous beliefs by the defendant that, first, personal information could be withheld until 
the payment of professional fees and, second, that accounting information and records were not 
personal information, were likewise evidenced in Director of Human Rights Proceedings v 
Hamilton,29 where significant damages were awarded against an accountant.30  
It will be shown below in Parts VI and VII that the Tribunal's approach has changed in the 
respective periods where Hindle and Haines have been its chairpersons. The changes may at least 
partly be explained by the egregious nature of contraventions as well as the parties responsible for 
them in the 2012–2016 period. These differences undoubtedly presented an opportunity for the 
Tribunal to greatly augment the remedies awarded to plaintiffs. It is significant, for instance, that three 
of the four cases where the Tribunal ordered training orders as a remedy were against private sector 
defendants. Whether consciously or otherwise the factors at play where a defendant is providing 
services for profit may differ from where the defendant is a public sector agency carrying out its 
functions.  
By comparison, the previous five years under Hindle as chairperson contained few cases that were 
substantially aligned in most respects with the examples above, especially those involving requests 
for information. Most tended to feature public sector defendants.31 One exception was Director of 
Human Rights Proceedings v QD, involving a medical practitioner who improperly withheld 
information from a patient, wrongly assuming that doctor-patient confidentiality overrode the Act.32 
The relatively modest damages award of $7,500 was further reduced to $5,000 by the High Court.33 
The sole decision from the earlier period that was difficult to reconcile with the later cases was 
Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Grupen.34 Here, a significant contravention of principle 6 
  
27  Section 66(3).  
28  Lochead-MacMillan, above n 9, at [7].  
29  Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Hamilton, above n 13. 
30  $20,000 in damages was awarded in addition to $7,500 in costs. 
31  See for example Holmes v Commissioner of Police [2009] NZHRRT 20 at [12]–[13]. Costs of $5,500 were 
awarded against the plaintiff who had stubbornly refused to accept an apology and financial settlement from 
the defendant, instead putting it to the expense of a defended hearing. 
32  Director of Human Rights Proceedings v QD [2010] NZHRRT 3 at [55].  
33  C v Director of Human Rights Proceedings HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-1662, 6 September 2010. 
34  Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Grupen [2010] NZHRRT 22. 
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occurred when a client sought information held by his lawyer relating to his affairs. The information 
– which included access to the lawyer's diary entries concerning the plaintiff – was needed by the 
client in connection with a dispute over the lawyer's fees. Despite the diary being lost,35 and there 
being no reasons to have withheld the information contained in it,36 the defendant behaved in an 
obstinate manner from the beginning through asserting to the plaintiff that the information was not 
personal information covered by the Act and then sticking to this position.37 The damages of $8,500 
awarded against the defendant were significantly less than in comparable cases in the later period 
where plaintiffs' requests for information had not been taken seriously.38 Some possible reasons for 
the discrepancies are explored further below.  
Significant contraventions of the Act, besides denial of access to information, have also featured 
private sector actors during Haines' tenure as chairperson of the Tribunal. The Act imposes obligations 
on agencies that hold personal information to ensure it is accurate, up-to-date, complete, relevant and 
not misleading before using it having regard to the purposes for which it is likely to be used.39 One 
of the most important spheres of application of this rule is where debt collection and credit reporting 
are concerned.  
Taylor v Orcon Ltd was such a case.40 The defendant, a major telecommunications provider, had 
demonstrated serious failures within its internal client management processes – with the left hand 
being ignorant of what the right hand was doing41 – as well as extremely poor customer relations.42 
These shortcomings led to the Act being contravened when a disputed debt of $50, which turned out 
not to be owed in the first place, resulted in the plaintiff, a soldier on deployment with the New 
Zealand Army, being unable to find rental accommodation for his family or obtain finance to help 
with relocation.43 The Tribunal stated the mischief in stark terms as follows:44 
  
35  At [4].  
36  At [44]–[45].  
37  At [17].  
38  At [59]–[64]. 
39  Privacy Act, s 6, principle 8. 
40  Taylor v Orcon Ltd, above n 12.  
41  At [9]. The customer was told their service was being blocked for non-payment of the account but no service 
was at the time in fact being provided.  
42  At [10]. The customer was ridiculed, not taken seriously and not allowed to speak to a manager.  
43  At [45].  
44  At [44]. 
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A creditor who instructs a debt collection agency knows not only there is a good chance that legal debt 
recovery proceedings will follow, but also that the claimed debt will be registered with a credit reporting 
agency such as Veda … . In legal proceedings there is opportunity to challenge the claim before a court 
or tribunal skilled in the adjudication of disputes and bound by the rules of fairness. At a minimum a 
hearing of the dispute can be required. None of these protections apply when a credit reporting agency 
provides a credit rating. The request for a credit rating and the response occurs without notice to the person 
inquired about, without their knowledge and without an opportunity to be heard. There is little or no 
practical recourse when a person's credit rating is reported in negative terms and there is no right of appeal. 
The right to request correction of credit information under the Credit Reporting Privacy Code is most 
often an ex post facto exercise and the individual affected may not even know an adverse credit report has 
been provided … 
The damages award of $25,000 was unsurprising given these circumstances. Taylor v Orcon Ltd is 
discussed further below in relation to the success rates of litigation in the Tribunal.  
A The Challenge of Social Media 
By far the most significant case to have thus far come before the Tribunal and the first to involve 
social media was Hammond v Credit Union Baywide, the "cake icing" case mentioned at the outset.45  
In this case, the plaintiff and a colleague had been amongst the best-qualified and talented 
employees at Baywide, which led senior managers who felt threatened by them to persecute them. 
Ironically, one of the concerns that had been raised by the plaintiff was Baywide being put at legal 
risk for non-compliance with the Privacy Act amongst other legal requirements.46 After resigning, the 
plaintiff iced a cake expressing her feelings towards her employer at a private function for a former 
colleague who had resigned before her. She then uploaded its image onto her Facebook page, with 
privacy settings limiting access to it to her friends. 
Baywide, however, responded to news of the private function through its human resources 
manager coercing a junior employee, who happened to be a Facebook friend of the plaintiff's, to allow 
access to her Facebook profile in order that a screenshot of the expletive-laden cake could be obtained. 
This image was then widely circulated to recruitment agencies throughout the region, damaging the 
plaintiff's future employment prospects, in addition to being circulated internally.47 
Furthermore, Baywide applied economic pressure on the plaintiff's new employer – a 
subcontractor to Baywide – to fire her under the 90-day trial period term that had been included in her 
  
45  Hammond, above n 2. For a detailed discussion of the legal issues raised by the case for both employment 
and privacy law see Roth, above n 20, at 668. 
46  Hammond, above n 2, at [13] and [127]. 
47  At [45] and [54]. The junior employee felt compelled to resign shortly thereafter, the employer bullying 
therefore resulting in the loss of three employees: at [43].  
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employment agreement, although in the event she left of her own accord so as not to cause undue 
financial and personal hardship to her new employer.48 The plaintiff, who had held a senior position 
at Baywide, struggled to find employment for a considerable time thereafter and was ultimately able 
to work only at a much lower level, which was humiliating and demeaning, personally and 
professionally.49 In addition, she had been unable to approach recruitment agencies due to Baywide's 
actions, being forced to approach employers directly, and had been uncertain on each occasion 
whether the screenshot of the cake had been disclosed to them.50 
These facts were undoubtedly taken into account in the Tribunal's unprecedented award of 
$168,000 in damages against Baywide,51 as it was stated that the case is "arguably the most serious 
to have come before the Tribunal to date".52 It was material also that Baywide had initially obfuscated 
as to its conduct when the Privacy Commissioner investigated the case and their eventual apology 
was found to be insincere.53 The Tribunal also made specific orders restraining future conduct as well 
as requiring retraction of the messages with the screenshots to all those to whom they had been sent,54 
a formal apology55 and, most important of all, that a training programme be implemented by Baywide, 
at its own expense and under the Privacy Commissioner's supervision, for staff as to their obligations 
under the Privacy Act.56 The lawfulness of the latter order as well as the appropriateness of the 
unprecedented damages award are considered at greater length in the discussion in Part VI as to the 
evolving nature of remedies in the Tribunal.  
Three key aspects in Hammond warrant further discussion. First, no contravention of principles 1 
to 4 (known collectively as the Act's "collection" obligations) were found to be actionable due to the 
difficulties in establishing a causative link between the way in which the screenshot was obtained and 
the harm that resulted to the plaintiff.57 The Tribunal referred to previous authority that, whilst 
  
48  At [53]. 
49  At [55]. 
50  At [54]. 
51  At [189]. The award under s 88(1) of the Privacy Act was made up as follows: $38,000 for lost income, 
$15,000 for legal expenses, $16,000 for career regression and the largest element, $98,000 for humiliation, 
loss of dignity and injury to feelings. However, no formal costs were awarded as the plaintiff had represented 
herself. 
52  At [179]. 
53  At [179]. 
54  See Privacy Act, s 85(1). 
55  Section 85(1)(d). 
56  Hammond, above n 2, at [189]; and see Privacy Act, s 85(1)(d)–(e). 
57  At [134]; and s 6. 
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inferences that harm resulting from a breach may be made, these could not be automatic.58 The 
reputational damage to the plaintiff could, for argument's sake, have occurred through 
communications between the defendant and recruitment agencies independent of the screenshot. 
Despite this, Professor Roth has commented that the Tribunal's approach is somewhat perplexing as, 
undoubtedly, the screenshot was the mischief from which all the others followed.59 Subsequent to 
Hammond, the Tribunal itself has adopted a more relaxed approach to causation in Taylor v Orcon 
Ltd.60 This is analysed in Part V.  
It is therefore worthwhile to consider, within the constraints of the present article, if any of these 
collection obligations may have been breached, or when an employer might in general terms be able 
to argue its conduct was warranted. It suffices to say that principles 1 to 4 deal with the legitimacy, 
manner and fairness of the means by which the information is acquired. For example, principle 2 does 
not allow information about an individual to be collected from persons other than that individual with 
some exceptions; whilst principle 1 forbids information from being collected in the first place where 
it is unconnected with a function or activity of the agency that seeks to collect it.   
In this context, Roth has noted the power imbalance that normally prevails between the parties in 
the employment arena as well as the legitimate interests an employer might have that often need to be 
balanced against the privacy expectations of employees.61 Indeed the courts have long recognised that 
conduct outside the workplace that brings the employer into disrepute can be a legitimate concern of 
employers.62  
In assessing the applicability of this principle in the social media environment, however, any 
judgment ought properly to consider whether the information was collected prior – for example whilst 
evaluating a prospective employee – during or after the employment relationship. Clearly, the further 
one moves from either end of this spectrum the less able an employer will be to argue the collection 
is necessary. On the facts of Hammond, though, no suggestion had been made that the screenshot was 
necessary for any legitimate purpose of the employer, it being instead motivated by hostility to the 
plaintiff with the intention of harming her.63  
On the other hand, in assessing the severity of emotional harm suffered by the plaintiff, as a 
consequence of the defendant's breach of principle 11 through disclosure of the screenshot, the 
  
58  Winter v Jans HC Hamilton CIV-2003-419-854, 6 April 2004 at [33]–[34]. 
59  Roth, above n 20, at 670. 
60  Orcon, above n 12. 
61  Paul Roth "Jurisdictional Options: the Human Rights Track" (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society 
Employment Law Conference, Auckland, October 2008) at 134. 
62  See Smith v Christchurch Press Company Ltd [2001] 1 NZLR 407 (CA) at [21].  
63  Hammond, above n 2, at [180].  
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Tribunal did take into account the bullying of the employee who had been forced to access her own 
Facebook page on the manager's computer.64 In part, this enabled it to distinguish it from the previous 
highest award under this category.65 Harm to the coerced employee could not, of course, also be 
considered to be harm to the plaintiff, particularly as the Tribunal had expressly chosen not to express 
any opinion as to whether the obtaining of the screenshot constituted a contravention of the Act. 
A more sanguine reading of the Tribunal's assessment of harm where the screenshot is concerned, 
might, on the other hand, see it as referring to the egregious nature of the information that was 
disclosed in breach of principle 11. The fact the information had been obtained through betrayal of 
friendship in the first place undoubtedly exacerbated the injury to the plaintiff. In a similar vein, 
despite the unavailability of exemplary damages under the Act,66 the Tribunal stated:67 
The award of damages is to compensate for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings, not to punish 
the defendant. The conduct of the defendant may, however, exacerbate (or, as the case may be, mitigate) 
the humiliation, loss of dignity or injury to feelings and therefore be a relevant factor in the assessment of 
the quantum of damages to be awarded for the humiliation, loss of dignity or injury to feelings. 
The second aspect in Hammond that merits discussion is the Tribunal's approach to the defendant's 
submission that the plaintiff lacked "clean hands" through breaching her duty of fidelity to it (the 
employer) by uploading the photograph to her Facebook page.68 This raised the interesting issue as to 
whether the defendant could avail itself of any existing exceptions in principle 11 that would 
countenance the disclosure of the screenshot. In addressing the issue, the Tribunal offered the 
following obiter statement:69 
The point which appears to have been lost on NZCU Baywide is that Principle 11 is about the 
responsibilities of the agency which has collected the personal information. The restrictions attach to the 
agency. Principle 11 does not permit (or condone) the disclosure of personal information on the grounds 
there has been supposed misconduct on the part of the individual. 
In the first place, the Tribunal found there had in fact been no misconduct by the employee as the 
context in which the words on the cake were expressed vindicated their use.70 This finding has some 
resonance with statements by the Employment Court that words and conduct must be taken in their 
  
64  At [181].  
65  This was the $40,000 awarded in Hamilton v The Deanery 2000 Ltd [2003] NZHRRT 28. 
66  See Evans, above n 5. 
67  Hammond, above n 2, at [170]. 
68  At [161]. 
69  At [162]. 
70  At [163]. 
452 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
context, viz, words which on their own may appear to indicate misconduct may take on an entirely 
different meaning when seen in their context – when for instance both parties to a communication 
were aware of the facts it relates to.71 
It should be noted, also, that the Act does not contain any counterpart to employment legislation 
whereby the extent to which an employee contributed to the situation that gave rise to the personal 
grievance may be taken into account when deciding the nature and extent of remedies to be 
provided.72 In addition, the exceptions to principle 11 of the Act are tightly drawn with the only 
possible exception that could have been invoked in the circumstances of Hammond being a belief on 
reasonable grounds that the source of the information is a publicly available publication.73 Although 
this was only tangentially dealt with by the Tribunal, through the comment that once a disclosure 
contravening principle 11 of the Act has been proven the burden to show that an exception applied74 
shifted to the defendant,75 it is worth further examination in the context of the present article. The 
term "publicly available publication" is defined as follows:76  
… a magazine, book, newspaper, or other publication that is or will be generally available to members of 
the public; and includes a public register …  
It is questionable whether the Facebook post, accessible to 150 friends, falls into this category. 
The number of friends would be fairly typical of most Facebook users in the position of the plaintiff. 
It has been argued that the function of social networks is not to give public access to individual 's 
information but rather to allow individuals to share their information with only those they choose.77 
That may be so, but the nature of digital media, which facilitates replication and distribution of 
information, might transform a private post into a publication. The courts have pointed to social media 
such as Facebook being qualitatively different to other communications.78 On the other hand, even a 
private conversation between friends in a bar can nowadays be recorded by a stranger on a device and 
  
71  See for example Booth v Big Kahuna Ltd [2014] NZEmpC 134, [2014] ERNZ 295 at [65].  
72  Employment Relations Act 2000, s 124. 
73  Privacy Act, s 6, principle 11(b).  
74  See s 87. 
75  Hammond, above n 2, at [190]. 
76  Privacy Act, s 2. 
77  Gehan Gunasekara and Alan Toy "'My-Space' or Public Space: The Relevance of Data Protection Laws to 
Online Social Networking" (2008) 23 NZULR 191 at 203. For a different perspective see Paul Roth "Data 
Protection Meets Web 2.0: Two Ships Passing in the Night" (2010) 33 UNSWLJ 532; and Paul Roth 
"Employment Law" [2014] NZ L Rev 453 at 478–479. 
78  Hook v Stream Group (NZ) Pty Ltd [2013] NZEmpC 243, (2013) NZELR 427 at [29]; and Senior v Police 
[2013] NZHC 357, [2013] NZFLR 356 at [6].  
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broadcast to millions instantaneously. Thus, the divide between the digital and physical world may be 
more imagined than real.  
It is therefore suggested that the correct approach must be a case by case assessment of whether 
the belief, as to the source being a publicly available publication, was reasonable. In the case of 
Hammond, any such belief could not be said to have been reasonably held as the employer had resorted 
to coercion to obtain a screenshot of the publication and had been unable to obtain it readily as might 
a member of the public.79 Furthermore, no evidence was adduced before the Tribunal that the picture 
was widely available to members of the public in the region or, indeed, within professional circles 
prior to the defendant circulating it.  
The third and final aspect of Hammond to be considered is the basis on which damages were 
awarded by the Tribunal. Roth has argued that the award of monetary damages for the "loss of any 
benefit",80 in respect of the pressure applied to the plaintiff's new employer to dismiss her, did not 
involve a breach of principle 11 as it was not a consequence of the defendant's disclosure of 
"information that the employer did not already know".81 This is because the new employer had seen 
the physical cake prior to seeing its screenshot and was already cognisant of the information contained 
in it.82 Once again, however, a more sanguine view might regard the disclosure of the defendant's 
opinions concerning the Facebook picture and its cautions to the new employer as amounting to a 
disclosure of new information about the plaintiff,83 thereby vindicating the Tribunal's conclusion if 
not its reasoning as to this aspect. 
Hammond is no doubt an exceptional case, but the employer's "high-handed and impulsive 
reaction" to the icing on the cake led, in the Tribunal's words, to "the infliction of serious harm not 
only on Ms Hammond but also on itself, its staff, its image and reputation".84 The case highlights in 
stark terms deficiencies in the private sector in training employees as to the Act's requirements, a 
frequent refrain in the cases catalogued for this article.  
B Jurisprudential Developments 
The cases contained in the most recent period surveyed by this article raise several novel 
jurisprudential issues that suggest the principles-based rules in the Act are capable of evolution in 
order to address the matters brought before the Tribunal. Some of these have concerned the application 
  
79  See The Sensible Sentencing Group Trust v The Human Rights Review Tribunal [2014] NZCA 264 at [33]. 
80  Privacy Act, s 88(1)(b).  
81  Roth, above n 20, at 671.  
82  Hammond, above n 2, at [140]–[141]. 
83  At [140].  
84  At [188].  
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of new technologies; Hammond is an example of litigation under the Act about the use of social media. 
Similarly, Armfield v Naughton was a case involving an acrimonious dispute between two neighbours 
over the defendant's use of several CCTV cameras that had been aimed at and had collected 
information about the plaintiff.85 The cameras were ostensibly used in connection with the defendant's 
bed and breakfast business,86 but were deliberately used in such a way to make the plaintiff believe 
his wife and children were being recorded. When the plaintiff, who was unsure as to the defendant's 
motives, asked for access to the digitally stored content, he was rebuffed with the response "not 
without a search warrant".87 
Armfield therefore engaged the Act's collection principles,88 as well as the right to access personal 
information.89 The Tribunal referred to the linkages between these. For instance the "information 
asymmetry" meant those under surveillance had no way of knowing if limits on the extent of it were 
being observed absent their right to access the data.90 It did not, however, require the Tribunal to 
address the "domestic affairs" exemption,91 as the defendant had accepted the cameras were being 
used in connection with his business and not for his personal, family or household purposes.92 
The Tribunal therefore had to deal with some fundamental conceptual features of the Act in 
applying it to the circumstances of the dispute. The question of "collection", for instance, is 
fundamental to the first four principles. The Tribunal adopted the submission of the Privacy 
Commissioner to the Law Commission;93 it concluded that:94 
The Act does not limit the term "collect" other than to exclude receipt of unsolicited information. The 
meaning of "collect" must therefore be ascertained from the text and purpose of the Privacy Act.  
  
85  Armfield v Naughton [2014] NZHRRT 48. 
86  One of the cameras, for example, provided a view of Mt Taranaki beyond the plaintiff's home, which was 
streamed live to the bed and breakfast website to provide a real-time picture of the mountain: at [8]. 
87  At [12]. 
88  Privacy Act, s 6, principles 1–4. 
89  Section 6, principle 6. 
90  Armfield, above n 85, at [56]. 
91  Privacy Act, s 56. 
92  Armfield, above n 85, at [30].  
93  Law Commission Report, above n 4, at [2.84]. 
94  Armfield, above n 85, at [44]. 
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It further developed this by stating that such a purposive approach led to a meaning that included 
"gathering together",95 and that:96 
A narrowing of the protection of the Privacy Act to those circumstances in which information is received 
and then only by soliciting in the sense of "to ask for" would be inconsistent with the promotion and 
protection of personal privacy. 
This statement is laudable as it demonstrates, for example, the ability of key concepts contained 
in the Act to be adapted to evolving technologies such as the Internet of Things and Big Data. The 
Tribunal further interpreted the statutory exclusion of "unsolicited information" narrowly,97 
concluding it was:98 
Information which comes into the possession of the agency in circumstances where the agency has taken 
no active steps to acquire or record that information. 
Accordingly, such exclusion would not apply to any automated system of surveillance, including 
CCTV, where steps have been taken to set up the system of collection. The same would be the case 
where, say, an employer installs software that allows an employee's keystrokes to be logged or even 
a simple radio-frequency identification (RFID) system that tracks employees' entry and egress to a 
building or movements within it. 
In applying the Act to the facts, the Tribunal held that in order to comply with principle 1 the 
information collected by an agency must be both connected with a lawful function of the agency and 
reasonably necessary for that purpose.99 It further held that application of this principle substantially 
overlapped with principle 4, which protects against unfair collection of information when it intrudes 
to an unreasonable extent on the affairs of the individual concerned.100 
The Tribunal found both principles to be contravened at least where the positioning of some of 
the cameras was concerned, as they collected footage that was not connected with the defendant's 
legitimate operations without using masking technology that obscured members of the plaintiff's 
  
95  At [44].  
96  At [44]. 
97  Privacy Act, s 2(1). 
98  Armfield, above n 85, at [44]. 
99  At [60]. 
100  At [60].  
456 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
family.101 Likewise, principle 6 had been contravened as the refusal to comply with the plaintiff's 
information request, without reasons, did not amount to a "decision" concerning the request.102 
Holmes v Housing New Zealand Corp, on the other hand, was a case that raised systemic issues 
as to the operation of the Act and is therefore undoubtedly of wider significance for the interpretation 
of the privacy principles.103 It concerned a vulnerable beneficiary caught between two state agencies 
each of which wished to collect information from him for different purposes. This led to the 
predicament where the plaintiff was put in the position of losing a benefit if he failed to agree to 
information provided to one agency for its purposes being also shared with the other agency.104 
In observing that principle 1 was an "overarching" principle from which the others flowed and 
ought, therefore, to be given a "broad and purposive interpretation",105 the Tribunal had to again 
consider the concept of "collect" as the agency had not, in fact, collected the information complained 
of since the plaintiff had, instead, chosen to forego the benefit. Referring to the seminal OECD 
Guidelines,106 the Tribunal concluded:107 
… collection is not an event (ie receipt of the data) but a process for the collection of data. That process 
must be in place, prior to the receipt of the data …  
Crucially, the Tribunal found that principle 1 could have application for an agency prior to the 
actual receipt of personal information.108 It further observed that other collection principles contained 
in the Act could likewise be engaged.109 It was thus found that principle 1 was engaged in this instance 
because a state institution had set up a system for collecting personal information from an identifiable 
class of persons that sought to collect information that was not reasonably necessary for the defendant 
agency's legitimate purposes.110 
  
101  At [64]–[65]. The Tribunal observed that, despite the defendant claiming to have studied both the Act and the 
Privacy Commissioner's CCTV Guidelines, "little had been understood or learnt" as the cameras were 
installed in an uncommunicative and confrontational manner: at [27].  
102  At [73]. See Privacy Act, ss 40(1) and 44.  
103  Holmes v Housing New Zealand Corp [2014] NZHRRT 54. 
104  At [49].  
105  At [71]. 
106  OECD "Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data" (2013) 
<www.oecd.org>.  
107  Holmes, above n 103, at [75] (emphasis added). 
108  At [76].  
109  At [77]. See also Privacy Act, s 6, principle 3(2). 
110  At [82] and [114].  
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Despite the Tribunal citing the opinion of Stephen Penk,111 that the generally-worded and 
imprecise statements of principles over more prescriptive rules risks uncertainty,112 it can be seen in 
Holmes that the Tribunal was nonetheless able to adapt them in order to address systemic failings 
within an agency. In this regard, the principles-oriented architecture of the Act can be said to be 
superior to more prescriptive rules that risk technological obsolescence.113 Furthermore, Holmes 
vindicates the Law Commission's recommendation to retain the principles-based approach and 
existing framework,114 whilst reforming the Act through empowering the Privacy Commissioner to 
address systemic issues through issuing compliance notices.115 
IV NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS 
The research conducted for this article followed, in part, the methodology of earlier studies that 
have explored the varied contexts in which litigation under the Act was brought.116 These contexts 
again revealed that most of the disputes brought before the Tribunal in the period of the current survey 
were linked to pre-existing disputes between the parties not involving privacy, or to pre-existing 
relationships that had broken down for one reason or another. Eighty-one per cent of the cases fell 
into this category whilst 19 per cent could not be identified with any certainty as being so linked and 
were therefore catalogued as being contextually connected with privacy alone. There was little, if any, 
difference in this trend between the Hindle and Haines Tribunals. A related inquiry was the specific 
nature of the disputes that led to the cases before the Tribunal. These categories are represented in the 
diagram below. 
  
  
111  At [80]. 
112  Stephen Penk "The Privacy Act 1993" in Steven Penk and Rosemary Tobin (eds) Privacy Law in New Zealand 
(Brookers, Wellington, 2010) 49 at 55. 
113  Gunasekara and Toy, above n 77. 
114  Law Commission Report, above n 4, at 2.10. 
115  At ch 6 and R63. The proposals have been accepted by the New Zealand Government: see Cabinet Paper 
"Reforming the Privacy Act 1993" (13 March 2014) at [59]. 
116  Gunasekara and Van Klink, above n 7. 
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Graph 1 (total number of cases = 56)117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is apparent that disputes with some connection to employment accounted for the lions' share,118 
although criminal law and matters connected with judicial processes were not far behind. The next 
largest category was labelled personal and domestic as it included many matters within the domestic 
or family sphere including disputes involving neighbours,119 school boards,120 and children and 
young persons.121 As was expected, matters arising from benefits and entitlements also featured 
prominently.122 For example, in one instance a delay in responding to an information request had led 
  
117  Human Rights Review Tribunal cases, 2007–2016. 
118  Some of the cases in this area overlapped with other categories but an assessment was made as to the nature 
of the dispute irrespective of where it emanated from. For example Waxman v Pal [2016] NZHRRT 28 
concerned a doctor who was caught moonlighting in contravention of her employment agreement, resulting 
in termination, but this was classified as being related to employment rather than medical. Compare Director 
of Human Rights Proceedings v QD, above n 32. 
119  Armfield, above n 85. 
120  Steele v Board of Trustees of Salisbury School [2012] NZHRRT 20.  
121  Z v Commissioner of Police [2010] NZHRRT 12. 
122  See for example NG v Commissioner of Police [2010] NZHRRT 16. 
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to a plaintiff's visitor's visa being endangered; this demonstrates the crucial role played by information 
rights in this area.123 
Even though litigation involving commercial and professional dealings was only fifth overall, as 
represented in the diagram, these cases are becoming increasingly prominent. The remainder were 
matters in relation to medical information, accident compensation (ACC), insurance and tenancy. The 
relative paucity of cases featuring ACC probably reflects significant improvements made by that 
organisation as to its information processing practices following a major independent review.124 An 
exception in this regard was Geary v Accident Compensation Corporation, where $20,000 in addition 
to $18,000 in costs was awarded to the plaintiff whose request for information had been refused on 
spurious grounds.125 
A number of plaintiffs in both periods of this study could be described as being vexatious in the 
broadest sense, although in only one instance were attempts made to have an individual formally 
declared as such.126 Many of these were cases where a litigant had been unsuccessful, in a forum 
other than the Tribunal and in relation to a matter other than contravention of the Act, but were now 
seeking to continue the conflict through means of the Act. Indeed many of the litigants were 
individuals with considerable experience in dealing with government agencies and reasonably 
familiar with the laws they operated under. This is a factor the courts have said must now be taken 
into account, especially when determining what is a "reasonable" standard for giving assistance to a 
person making an information request.127 As illustrated by the litigant in question:128  
… by quoting and distinguishing between what he was entitled to under the Privacy Act, under the Official 
Information Act, and under the Ombudsmen Act. He was not a hapless beneficiary in need of help. On 
the contrary, he was and is an intelligent, well-informed beneficiary, who has argued familiarity with 
various statutes which provide him remedies. 
One individual was responsible for five substantive proceedings before the Tribunal.129 In one 
instance, despite a declaration in his favour being made, costs of $5,500 were awarded against him 
due to the defendant having been put to the expense of a defended hearing despite a reasonable 
  
123  Koso v Chief Executive, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZHRRT 39. 
124  KPMG and Information Integrity Solutions Independent Review of ACC's Privacy and Security of Information 
(Privacy Commissioner and Accident Compensation Corporation, 22 August 2012). 
125  Geary v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZHRRT 34. 
126  Reid v New Zealand Fire Commission [2008] NZHRRT 8 at [2]. 
127  Holmes, above n 1, at [78]–[79]. 
128  At [78]. 
129  Gordon Henry Holmes.  
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settlement offer having previously being made.130 Another was responsible for at least six none of 
which were successful.131 Furthermore, a clear trend that emerged in the Tribunal during the period 
of Haines' tenure has been the articulation of "standards to be expected of a litigant",132 contravention 
of which constitute grounds for denial of a remedy even where the technical elements for a 
contravention of the Act are present.  
For example, in Rafiq v Commissioner of Inland Revenue it was found that:133 
The repeated, calculated and wholly unjustified attacks which Mr Rafiq has made on virtually all persons 
who have had dealings with him are serious. We find that his behaviour is properly described as an 
"exceptionally egregious" breach of the standards to be expected of a litigant and for that reason 
declaratory relief is to be denied. 
Likewise, in Steele v Board of Trustees of Salisbury School declaratory relief was denied as the 
plaintiff's communications with the other party had been made in aggressive and offensive terms and 
had contained unfounded allegations.134 
In several of the cases in both periods, however, were instances where unsuccessful plaintiffs had 
large costs rulings made against them. One such case was Cameron v Police.135 Thus, it will be noted 
there are significant disincentives to plaintiffs who choose to use the Act in order to perpetuate a 
campaign of abuse as well as those with legitimate grievances who spurn reasonable attempts at 
conciliation in order to "have their day in court".  
V SUCCESS RATE FOR PLAINTIFFS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
TO REPRESENTATION 
In the ten-year period covered by this article, 55 per cent of claims were unsuccessful in the 
Tribunal.136 This marks a slight improvement overall of success rates for litigants over the period 
covered in the most recent previous study.137 However, this does not reveal the entire picture as there 
was a marked increase in success rates in the five years after Haines became chairperson.  
  
130  Holmes v Commissioner of Police, above n 31. 
131  Rafiq v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZHRRT 12. 
132  Geary v New Zealand Psychologists Board [2012] NZHC 384 at [108]. 
133  Rafiq, above n 131, at [49]. 
134  Steele v Board of Trustees of Salisbury School, above n 120, at [56]. 
135  Cameron v Police [2010] NZHRRT 11. The Tribunal stated at [14]: "The fact that Mr Cameron refused to 
settle at that time and on those terms should operate to significantly increase the ultimate award". 
136  Success denotes a remedy of one kind or another awarded under the Privacy Act, s 85. 
137 Gunasekara and Van Klink, above n 7, at 234. 
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Notably, in this regard, only 32 per cent of claims succeeded in the five-year period during which 
Hindle was chairperson. By contrast, 68 per cent were unsuccessful in this period. During the five 
years to date since Haines became chairperson, however, 54 percent of claims were successful. It can 
be seen therefore that the majority of litigants can now expect to be successful. It is also striking that 
this trend is at variance with prevailing success rates of litigation observed by earlier studies of 
litigation in the Tribunal.138 
The relationship of success rates to representation, however, was by far the most revealing aspect 
discerned from the data gathered by the study. Representation, in this context, encapsulated several 
categories and differed from where say the plaintiff appeared in person before the Tribunal to advance 
his or her claim.139 These included legal representation, "McKenzie-friends" as well as those cases 
brought on their behalf by the Director of Human Rights Proceedings (DHRP), which obviously 
would be legal in nature.  
The data reveals that representation makes a noticeable difference as to success rates but that in 
the most recent five-year period it can be seen to overwhelmingly improve the chances of success 
especially where legal representation is involved. Put another way, in the Tribunal during Haines' 
tenure to date, a litigant with legal representation has an 85 per cent chance of success. This compares 
with 42 per cent under the comparable period of Hindle's tenure. 
The two sets of tables below compare the two periods as far as the effect of representation is 
concerned.  
Table 1 (total number of cases = 14)140 
Success Rate with Representation: Hindle Tribunal Number of Cases Percentage Value 
Successful 6 43% 
Unsuccessful 8 57% 
Table 2 (total number of cases = 20)141 
Success Rate with Representation: Haines Tribunal Number of Cases Percentage Value 
Successful 15 75% 
Unsuccessful 5 25% 
  
138  See Gunasekara and Dillion, above n 6; and Gunasekara and Van Klink, above n 7. 
139  See for example Fehling v South Westland Area School [2012] NZHRRT 15. 
140  Human Rights Review Tribunal cases, 2007–2011. 
141  Human Rights Review Tribunal cases, 2012–2016. 
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Linked to these trends it is pertinent to observe also a declining trend regarding the proportion of 
cases brought before the Tribunal due to referral by the Privacy Commissioner through the DHRP.142 
These referrals have slowed to a trickle with only two each in the years 2015 and 2016,143 and many 
of the successful claims before the Tribunal have been those brought and funded by individuals, 
including Hammond itself. As seen above, these individuals were more likely to be successful when 
they were supported by representation, with legal representation having the greatest impact.  
A likely explanation for the more recent success rates of litigants could be the Haines Tribunal's 
more relaxed attitude towards causation, which may have been at play earlier but was first explicitly 
articulated in the Orcon decision.144 In this seminal decision, the Tribunal pointed to the reality that 
harm is "seldom the outcome of a single cause",145 citing the leading text on torts by Stephen Todd.146 
This led to the Tribunal stating that:147 
It is not necessary for the cause to be the sole cause, main cause, direct cause, indirect cause or "but for" 
cause. No form of words will ultimately provide an automatic answer to what is essentially a broad 
judgment. 
In this respect, the Tribunal expressly disapproved of the opinions of the Privacy Commissioner's 
investigating staff who were found to have applied an "unrealistically high" causation standard "at 
odds" with the language and purpose of the Act.148 
Finally, previous studies of privacy litigation in the Tribunal have found that only in a few 
instances have the courts shown a willingness to interfere with the Tribunal's discretion in awarding 
remedies.149 The role played by the High Court with regards to the types and legitimacy of remedies 
awarded in the time frame of the present research is discussed below in relation to the evolving nature 
of remedies. However, it is worth noting that the success rate of appeals to the High Court was very 
  
142  Privacy Act, s 77(3). 
143  Privacy Commissioner Annual Report 2016 (Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2016). 
144  Orcon, above n 12.  
145  At [60]. 
146  Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) at 
[20.2.02]. 
147  Orcon, above n 12, at [61].  
148  At [63]. The Commissioner had required the plaintiff to establish that the presence of the Orcon default on 
his credit report was the reason for his inability to obtain both accommodation and a loan. 
149  Gunasekara and Dillon, above n 6, at [18].  
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small in the period of this study with only five being partially successful with no Tribunal decisions 
being reversed in their entirety.150 
VI NATURE OF REMEDIES AWARDED 
Under the Act, the Tribunal is able to award one or more of five types of remedies being 
declaratory, injunctive, monetary, specific performance as well as the catch-all "other relief".151 The 
current period under study revealed that declarations were most prevalent followed by damages and 
then other remedies such as performance orders. However, a discernible trend was an increase in both 
performance orders and other relief such as training orders. The specific statutory bases for these were 
not always articulated with clarity. 
For instance, Armfield involved not only a declaration and damages under s 85(1) of the Act, but 
also involved the defendant having to undertake a number of specific actions. These were first to make 
adjustments to the surveillance cameras either physically or through the use of masking software. 
Secondly, the defendant had to provide the plaintiff with specific information as to the purposes and 
nature of information collected as required by principle 3 of the Act and this was to be repeated in the 
event of any changes to the surveillance system. Finally, there was an order requiring destruction of 
information already collected and written confirmation of it to the plaintiff and their lawyer.152 Roth 
has criticised the requirement to comply with the notice requirements in principle 3(1)(a)–(g) as being 
redundant since the Tribunal had already ordered that no further filming of the plaintiff's property was 
allowed.153  
This criticism may have some substance, although a broad reading of principle 3 might, in some 
circumstances, extend to notification that information had ceased to be collected. Also, the order here 
was prospective in case any change occurred. In any event, it is noteworthy that the Act was 
instrumental in restoring communication between the parties and was seen to be capable – in terms of 
remedies – of providing ongoing reporting obligations where needed.154 There can be little doubt, in 
this case, that the Act is sufficiently wide to encapsulate these types of remedies. 
Likewise, a significant trend that was evidenced in the period during Haines' tenure was the award 
of specific performance in relation to making information available when it had been requested. There 
  
150  See for example C v Director of Human Rights Proceedings, above n 33. 
151  Privacy Act, s 85(1).  
152  Armfield, above n 85, at [107]. 
153  Paul Roth Privacy Law and Practice (looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [PVA 85.6]. 
154  Armfield, above n 85, at [98]. 
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were seven such orders in this period compared to none in the previous five years.155 During the 
earlier period, where information was found to have been improperly withheld, damages tended to be 
awarded for loss of benefits as well as injury to feelings in addition to declaratory relief.156 This is 
especially curious as in some of these cases having access to the information had been of crucial 
importance to the litigants involved.157 
On the other hand, the recent trend where the Tribunal has made training orders, under the power 
to require a defendant to "perform any acts specified in the order with a view to remedying the 
interference" as well as the catch-all "other relief as the Tribunal thinks fit", raises serious questions 
as to its jurisdiction.158 Such orders, witnessed in Hammond have been made where the defendant had 
evidenced a lack of awareness as to the obligations required of it under the Act.159 The orders 
inevitably require the organisation and its staff to undergo a training programme, at its own expense, 
in conjunction with the Privacy Commissioner.160 They have been made in four cases,161 all of which 
were within the 2012–2016 period.  
Roth notes that the Human Rights Act 1993 was amended in 2001 to make explicit provision for 
the making of training orders,162 but that the provision does not apply to proceedings under the Act.163 
The obvious lack of jurisdiction to make such orders was successfully challenged in the High Court 
in Holmes.164 The Court accepted two grounds of challenge, the first being the natural justice 
argument that "once the Tribunal was considering the possibility of finding systemic failure, it should 
have given the department an opportunity to submit evidence to refute it".165 
  
155  Although in one case during this earlier period, the High Court ordered a limited amount of previously 
withheld documents to be released: see Reid v Crown Law Office HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-1203, 21 
April 2009. 
156  See for example Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Grupen, above n 34.  
157  See for example Director of Human Rights Proceedings v QD, above n 32; and Shahroodi v Director of Civil 
Aviation [2011] NZHRRT 6. 
158  Privacy Act, ss 85(1)(d)–(e).  
159  Hammond, above n 2, at [185]. 
160  In one instance, the defendant was required to attend a workshop at their own expense run by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner: Director of Human Rights Proceedings v Crampton [2015] NZHRRT 35. 
161  Hammond, above n 2; Taylor v Orcon Ltd, above n 12; Crampton, above n 160; and Deeming v Whangarei 
District Council [2015] NZHRRT 55.  
162  Human Rights Act, s 92I(3)(f).  
163  Privacy Act, s 89. See also Roth, above n 153, at [PVA 85.6].  
164  Holmes, above n 1.  
165  At [95].  
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The second substantive ground, however, was that the power conferred by the Act to make orders 
"remedying the interference", as well as the catch-all "other relief",166 are not intended to apply in 
respect of prospective conduct in relation to individuals other than the plaintiff, as the orders were 
"designed to provide relief to the aggrieved individual".167 Indeed, earlier High Court authority on 
the catch-all provision had emphasised that it is:168 
… to deal with incidental and ancillary matters. It should not be interpreted as an open cheque to provide 
any relief which the Tribunal after the hearing has concluded … determines might be appropriate.  
It may be that the omission from the 2001 amendments of the specific power to make training 
orders in the Act was inadvertent. There may also be circumstances – say where the plaintiff has an 
ongoing relationship with the agency in question – where the making of such orders under the generic 
provisions in the Act discussed above is merited. The ongoing issuance of the remedy in the cases 
that have followed the High Court's decision in Holmes is, however, problematic. Possible 
explanations as to why further challenges have not occurred may be due to the fact that the majority 
of defendants concerned were private sector agencies, together with the adverse publicity that may 
occur should an agency demonstrate a lack of willingness to undertake training where its procedures 
have been shown to be deficient.  
Two further aspects are raised by the decision in Holmes. First, the Court disposed of the argument 
that the Tribunal was not at liberty to award damages in excess of those sought by the plaintiff by 
adverting to the non-technical nature of the jurisdiction, distinguishing in this regard cases from the 
employment arena,169 whilst emphasising the fact that applicants before the Tribunal frequently 
lacked legal representation or advice.170 Secondly, in regard to the discretion afforded to the Tribunal 
and its chairperson as to damages – raised at the outset of this article – the Court stated as follows:171 
We do not agree … that the Tribunal must always take its lead from the High Court. The High Court sits 
as an appeal Court. The Tribunal is dealing with a much higher number of cases. We see no reason why 
the Tribunal, at first instance, cannot come to the conclusion that the time has come for a recalibration of 
the level of awards against which there should be some consistency. 
Whether such a recalibration has occurred and its extent are the focus of the next section.  
  
166  Privacy Act, s 85(1)(d)–(e). 
167  Holmes, above n 1, at [100].  
168  BHP New Zealand Steel Ltd v O'Dea (1997) 4 HRNZ 456 (HC) at 478.  
169  McCulloch and Partners v Smith CA133/03, 3 December 2003.  
170  Holmes, above n 1, at [108]. 
171  At [129].  
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VII HAS THE TRIBUNAL'S APPROACH TO REMEDIES 
CHANGED? 
As will by now be obvious, significant changes can be seen to have taken place in the Tribunal 
during the periods examined in this study.  
In terms of damages, there has been a noticeable upward trend in the recent period. The table 
below represents the range, mean and median figures for the five years while Hindle was chairperson.    
Table 3 (total number of cases = 7)172 
Damages Awarded: Hindle Tribunal 
Range $3,500 to $10,000 
Mean $5,812.50 
Median $6,000 
By comparison, the figures for the Haines era represent a startling change. Although the range is 
extended at both ends, the addition of Hammond results in the mean being $21,782 and the median 
$16,000. A better assessment, however, may be made with the removal of Hammond on the basis that 
it is an outlier. The table below represents the range, mean and median figures excluding Hammond.  
Table 4 (total number of cases = 17)173 
It is apparent that, even excluding the outlier, the mean has doubled and the median has more than 
doubled. The discussion above has highlighted the changing nature of defendants as well as their 
conduct as being one possible determinant for this trend. The Tribunal has been less forgiving in 
relation to private sector defendants than public sector ones, especially where the former have shown 
a lack of awareness or a blithe attitude towards the obligations contained in the Act. Public sector 
  
172  Human Rights Review Tribunal cases, 2007–2011. 
173  Human Rights Review Tribunal cases, 2012–2016. 
Damages Awarded: Haines Tribunal (excluding Hammond) 
Range $400 to $25,000 
Mean  $13,181 
Median $15,000 
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defendants, however, were more likely to have available one or more exceptions, especially when 
resisting requests for information.174 
Nonetheless, the assessment highlights differences in the Tribunal's attitudes as to the relative 
harms stemming from privacy breaches as contrasted with the breaches of other human rights 
obligations. In order to do this, the present study made a brief foray to examine the remedies – 
especially where damages and training orders are concerned – in the Tribunal's parallel human rights 
jurisdiction.  
This comparison showed that, first, in the five-year period studied that Hindle was chairperson of 
the Tribunal, 29 cases arose in the aforementioned jurisdiction. Damages were awarded in five (the 
mean being $46,500 with the median at $30,000) and training orders in one. The damages were around 
eight times the average damages that were awarded in the same time frame under the privacy 
jurisdiction.175  
During the five-year period to date that Haines has been chairperson of the Tribunal it has presided 
over 37 cases in the parallel non-privacy jurisdiction with damages being awarded in eight and training 
orders in four. The mean was $45,046 and the median was $28,266. This means that the awards under 
the non-Privacy Act jurisdiction are now around three and a half times the amounts awarded under 
the Privacy Act jurisdiction, excluding the outlier of Hammond. Taken in this context, the upward 
trend in the Privacy Act jurisdiction where damages are concerned is thus unexceptional.  
Similarly, a brief survey of training orders as a remedy in the Tribunal during the comparable 
period reveals that only one such order was made during Hindle's tenure,176 whereas four have been 
made by the Tribunal under Haines' tenure to date in the parallel non-Privacy Act jurisdiction. In the 
Haines Tribunal, however, four training orders have also been made under the Privacy Act jurisdiction 
as outlined above. Leaving aside the legality of the training orders under the Act, this shows consistent 
treatment of defendants who have shown a lack of awareness as to their obligations under statutes 
such as the Act, the Human Rights Act 1993, and the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994.  
  
174  The most commonly used exception for resisting an information request was s 29(1)(a) followed by s 27(1)(c) 
of the Privacy Act. By comparison the most cited exceptions with regard to alleged contraventions of principle 
11 were principle 11(a), (d) and (e)(i) of the Privacy Act, s 6.  
175  The average damages under the Privacy Act being $5,812.  
176  EN v EIC [2010] NZHRRT 9. 
468 (2017) 48 VUWLR 
On the other hand, it may be premature to say that the amount awarded in Hammond was 
completely out of proportion with human rights awards other than for breach of the Act,177 as awards 
in the parallel jurisdiction have more recently also been larger.178 
The analysis above in comparing the privacy and non-privacy jurisdictions has revealed some 
interesting data concerning the awards made by the Tribunal. First, during Hindle's tenure the Tribunal 
has made relatively larger awards of damages in the non-privacy area whilst being more tentative in 
its awards of damages and other relief in favour of plaintiffs in litigation under the Act.  
In comparison, the Tribunal under Haines has been more consistent in its awards in both areas 
especially in relation to training orders, whilst being more sympathetic towards privacy claims, which 
are clearly being treated – if the averages are taken into account – as more akin to claims of 
discrimination under the human rights jurisdiction. This illustrates, more than anything else that the 
law in this area is governed by discretion rather than being purely rules-driven.  
Finally, it is clear that, in the more recent period, the Tribunal has regarded technical 
contraventions, especially where access to information is concerned,179 as more serious than 
previously, relying on the Act's strict procedural rules.180 The stricter approach may be justified due 
to the reticence in implementing the Law Commission and Cabinet recommendations that the Privacy 
Commissioner ought to be empowered, in the first instance, to make enforceable decisions concerning 
access to information.181   
VIII CONCLUSION 
This article has investigated the changing nature of New Zealand's Privacy Act jurisprudence 
against the backdrop of prolonged delays in implementing changes to the Act as well as the extent of 
discretion held by the Human Rights Review Tribunal on the outcomes of litigation before it. It has 
found that discretion played a significant role alongside other significant trends including the recent 
growth in the number of private sector defendants before the Tribunal, including some large corporate 
actors. The article has demonstrated that litigation involving the Privacy Act has affected nearly all 
sectors and professions, suggesting that data privacy can no longer be seen as a specialist topic of little 
relevance to mainstream legal practice.  
Moreover, the discretion afforded to the Tribunal to provide appropriate remedies, including the 
award of higher damages, has not, on the whole, been interfered with by courts of law. Thus, the 
  
177  See for example Roth, above n 20, at 671–672.  
178  MacGregor v Craig [2016] NZHRRT 6. 
179  Privacy Act, s 6, principle 6. 
180  Section 40. See also Hamilton, above n 13. 
181  Law Commission Report, above n 4, at [R56]; and Cabinet Paper, above n 115, at [80]. 
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Tribunal has been able to adapt to changing societal expectations regarding privacy. The research has 
found, in this regard, that higher privacy awards can be seen as playing "catch-up" to awards in the 
Tribunal's non-Privacy Act jurisdiction.  
The Tribunal has to an extent also been able to address the legislative deficit through ordering 
specific performance as a remedy in relation to providing access to personal information, as opposed 
to ex post damages for improperly withholding it. In so doing, the Tribunal can be seen to have 
recognised the utility of personal information as being a vital currency for individuals in the digital 
age. Likewise, in the last ten years, the Tribunal has further refined and developed New Zealand's 
principles-based data privacy framework through expounding on the nature of information collection 
and its application to systems within organisations as well as technologies such as CCTV. A more 
nuanced approach to causation further illustrates the Tribunal's appreciation of the way in which 
personal information now shapes individuals' lives.  
Finally, the article has found that, despite the existence of the principles-based substantive privacy 
architecture, the rules-based nature of the remedies provided by the Act constitutes a significant 
impediment to the development of remedies for systemic privacy failures. Although the principles-
based specialist privacy jurisprudence in New Zealand has been shown to be governed to a large 
extent by discretion, the formalism of rules still to some extent inhibits flexibility. Reducing this 
formalism can only be achieved through law reform. The Tribunal has shown itself willing to act to 
address the needs of New Zealand's changing society. The rest is up to Parliament.  
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